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Abstract
Philosophically, one of the most important questions in the enterprise termed
confirmation theory is this: Why should one stick to well confirmed theories rather
than to any other theories? This paper discusses the answers to this question one
gets from absolute and incremental Bayesian confirmation theory. According to
absolute confirmation, one should accept “absolutely well confirmed” theories,
because absolute confirmation takes one to true theories. An examination of two
popular measures of incremental confirmation suggests the view that one should
stick to incrementally well confirmed theories, because incremental confirmation
takes one to (the most) informative (among all) true theories. However, incre-
mental confirmation does not further this goal in general. I close by presenting
a necessary and sufficient condition for revealing the confirmational structure in
almost every world when presented separating data.
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1. Introduction
Philosophically, one of the most important questions in the enterprise traditionally
termed confirmation theory is this: Why should one stick to well confirmed the-
ories rather than to any other theories? In other and more mundane words: What
is the point of confirmation? In what follows I will examine whether and how
absolute and incremental Bayesian confirmation theory answer this question.
According to absolute Bayesian confirmation theory, an agent’s degree of ab-
solute confirmation of some hypothesis or theory H by a piece of evidence E
relative to a body of background information B equals the probability of H given
E andB, Pr (H | E ∧B), where Pr : L → < is the agent’s actual degree of belief
function on some language L (see section 2). According to incremental Bayesian
confirmation theory, an agent’s degree of incremental confirmation of H by E
relative to B is measured by a relevance measure rPr based on the agent’s actual
degree of belief function Pr; i.e. a possibly partial function rPr : L×L×L → <
such that for all H,E,B ∈ L with Pr (E ∧B) > 0:
rPr (H,E,B)
>
=
<
0 ⇔ Pr (H | E ∧B)
>
=
<
Pr (H | B) .
2. The Point of Absolute Confirmation
The traditional answer to our question is something like this: Science aims at true
theories, and one should accept well confirmed theories, because confirmation
takes one to true theories. Indeed, if arriving at true theories is our (only) goal,
then there is a point to absolute confirmation. In the long run, absolute confirma-
tion almost surely takes one to true theories. This is the content of the following
theorem (Gaifman and Snir 1982, 507):
Theorem 1 (Gaifman and Snir) Let S = {Ai ∈ L : i = 0, 1, . . .} separateModL,
let Aωi be Ai if ω |= Ai and ¬Ai otherwise, and let [B] (ω) be 1 if ω |= B and 0
otherwise. Then for every B ∈ L,
Pr
(
B |
∧
0≤i<n
Aωi
)
→ [B] (ω) almost everywhere as n→∞.
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Here is the relevant technical background. L is obtained from a first-order lan-
guage for arithmetic, L0, by adding finitely many “empirical” predicates and func-
tion symbols (whose interpretation is not fixed). L0 contains all numerals ‘1’, . . .
as individual constants; countably many individual variables ‘x1’, . . . taking val-
ues in the set of natural numbers N ; the common symbols ‘+’, ‘·’, and ‘=’ for
addition, multiplication, and identity, respectively; and the standard quantifiers
and connectives. In addition, there may be finitely many predicates and function
symbols denoting certain fixed relations over N . The set of well formed formulas
of L is denoted by ‘L’, which is also called a language.
A model ω for L consists of an interpretation ϕ of the empirical symbols
which assigns every k-ary predicate ‘P ’ a subset ϕ (‘P ’) ⊆ Nk, and every k-ary
function symbol ‘f ’ a function ϕ (‘f ’) from Nk to N . The interpretation of the
symbols in L0 is the standard one and is kept the same in all models. ModL is the
set of all models for L. ‘ω |= A’ says that formula A is true in model ω ∈ModL.
A [x1, . . . , xk] is valid, |= A [x1, . . . , xk], iff ω |= A [n1/x1, . . . , nk/xk] for all
ω ∈ ModL and all n1, . . . , nk ∈ N . Here, ‘A [n1/x1, . . . , nk/xk]’ results from
‘A [x1, . . . , xk]’ by uniformously substituting ‘ni’ for ‘xi’ in ‘A’, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
‘A [x1, . . . , xk]’ indicates that ‘x1’, . . ., ‘xk’ are the only variables occurring free
in ‘A’.
A function Pr : L → <≥0 is a probability on L iff for all A,B ∈ L:
1. |= A↔ B ⇒ Pr (A) = Pr (B)
2. |= A ⇒ Pr (A) = 1
3. |= ¬ (A ∧B) ⇒ Pr (A ∨B) = Pr (A) + Pr (B)
4. Pr (∃xA [x]) = sup {Pr (A [n1/x] ∨ . . . ∨ A [nk/x]) : n1, . . . , nk, k ∈ N}
The conditional probability of A given B, Pr (A | B), is defined as
5. Pr (A | B) = Pr (A ∧B) /Pr (B),
provided Pr (B) > 0. Pr is regular iff the converese of 2. holds as well,
6. Pr (A) = 1 ⇒ |= A.
A set of sentences S ⊆ L separates a set of modelsX ⊆ModL just in case for any
two distinct ω1, ω2 ∈ X there is an A ∈ S such that ω1 |= A and ω2 6|= A. The set
of all atomic empirical sentences separates ModL (Gaifman and Snir 1982, 507).1
However, absolute confirmation has long been abandoned in favour of incre-
mental confirmation. Is there another goal for incremental confirmation that is
different from arriving at true theories? If so, what is this goal?
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3. What Is the Point of Incremental Confirmation?
Two popular measures of incremental confirmation are the distance measure d
(Earman 1992) and the Joyce-Christensen measure s (Joyce 1999, Christensen
1999):
dPr (H,E,B) = Pr (H | E ∧B)− Pr (H | B) ,
sPr (H,E,B) = Pr (H | E ∧B)− Pr (H | ¬E ∧B) .
What do these measures measure? Reformulating d and s shows that d increases
with
• the plausibility of H given E and B, p = Pr (H | E ∧B), and
• the evidence neglecting or data independent semantic informativeness of H
relative to B, i0 = Pr (¬H | B).
Similarly, s increases with
• the plausibility of H given E and B, p = Pr (H | E ∧B), and
• the evidence based or data dependent semantic informativeness of H rela-
tive to E and B, i.e. the amount to which H informs about E relative to B,
i1 = Pr (¬H | ¬E ∧B).
This is clearly seen by rewriting d and s as follows:
dPr (H,E,B) = Pr (H | E ∧B) + Pr (¬H | B)− 1,
sPr (H,E,B) = Pr (H | E ∧B) + Pr (¬H | ¬E ∧B)− 1.
p and i0 as well as p and i1 are conflicting in the sense that p decreases, whereas
i0 and i1 increase with the logical strength of the hypothesis to be assessed. So d
and s weigh between two conflicting aspects, viz. the plausibility and the infor-
mativeness of the hypothesis to be assessed.
In section 4 I will argue in more detail that i0 and i1 measure two different, but
equally sensible kinds of informativeness. Section 5 provides another argument
for the thesis that (i) d and s do nothing but weigh between the two conflicting
goals of plausibility and informativeness; (ii) that they are exactly alike in the way
they weigh between these two aspects; and (iii) that they differ from each other
just in the respect that d is based on data independent informativeness whereas s
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is based on informativeness about the data. All this suggests the following answer
to the question what goal incremental confirmation is supposed to further: Sci-
ence aims at informative true theories, and one should stick to incrementally well
confirmed theories, because incremental confirmation takes one to (the most) in-
formative (among all) true theories. However, as shown in section 6, incremental
confirmation does not further this goal in general. I close by giving a necessary
and sufficient condition for revealing the confirmational structure in almost every
world when presented separating data.
4. Measuring Semantic Information
In a subjective Bayesian framework it is clear that p = Pr (H | E ∧B) measures
the plausibility of H in view of E and B. It is still rather obvious that i0 =
Pr (¬H | B) measures the data independent informativeness of H relative to B.
i0 was already considered by Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952), Bar-Hillel and Carnap
(1953), Hempel (1960, 1962), and Hintikka and Pietarinen (1966) (for the notion
of semantic information cf. Bar-Hillel 1952, 1955). The second measure that was
discussed in this connection is
i2 = − log2 Pr (H | B) = log2
1
Pr (H | B) .
i2 is ordinally equivalent to i0, and so does not differ from i0 in the respects of
interest for the present discussion.
It is less obvious that i1 = Pr (¬H | ¬E ∧B) measures how much H in-
forms about the data E relative to background B. Following the above mentioned
literature, one would expect something like2
i3 = Pr (¬H | E ∧B) ,
cont = Pr (E) · Pr (¬H | E ∧B) ,
inf = log2
1
Pr (H | E ∧B) = − log2 Pr (H | E ∧B) .
As is often the case, a picture says more than a thousand words3:
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The background information B determines the set of possibilities in the inquiry,
and thus is nothing but a restriction on the set of possible worlds over which
inquiry has to succeed (cf. Hendricks 2004). H is the hypothesis whose informa-
tiveness about the data E is to be assessed (relative to B). Suppose you are asked
to strengthen H by deleting possibilities verifying it, that is, by shrinking the area
representing H . Would you not delete possibilities outside E? After all, given E,
those are exactly the possibilities known not to be the actual one, whereas those
possibilities inside E are still alive options. Indeed, i1 increases when H shrinks
to H ′ as depicted in the second figure, because it measures how much of ¬E is
occupied by ¬H .
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As a consequence, the information H provides about E is maximal if H log-
ically implies E (in this case H is completely within E, and so ¬H covers all of
¬E). So according to i1, two hypotheses both logically implying all of the data –
say, a complete theory about the world, and a theory-like collection of the data –
carry the same maximal amount of information about E. In a sense, this is odd,
because one would like the complete theory to come out as more informative than
the theory-like collection of the data. This is what i0 yields. For i0 it does not
matter which possibilities one deletes in strengthening H (provided all possibili-
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ties have equal weight on the probability measure Pr). i0 neglects whether they
are inside or outside E. The other candidates for measuring semantic information
do rather poorly on this count: they require the deletion of the possibilities inside
E. (Another reason why i3, cont, and inf seem to be inappropriate in the present
context is presented in the next section.)
The background information B plays a role different from that of the evidence
E for i0 and i1, but not for i3, cont, or inf. Clearly, there is a difference between
data on the one hand and background assumptions on the other; and this differ-
ence should show up somewhere. Apart from the above mentioned point that B
determines the set of possibilities over which inquiry has to succeed, whereas E
is gathered in order to indicate which of these possibilities is the actual one, there
is the following difference: Hypothese are supposed to inform about the world,
and hence also about the data, but they are usually not supposed to inform about
the background assumptions. (If one holds there should be no difference between
E and B as far as measuring information is concerned, then one can nevertheless
adopt the above measures by substituting E ′ = E ∧ B and B′ = > for E and B,
respectively.)
In order to avoid that one has to take sides between i0 and i1 let us call a
possibly partial function i = fi0,i1 : L × L × L → [0, 1] a strength indicator
(based on i0 and i1) if and only if f is non-decreasing in both and increasing in at
least one of its arguments i0 and i1, and fi0,i1 = 1 for i0 = i1 = 1.
5. Expected Informativeness as One Way of Weighing
Having tried to make plausible that i0 and i1 measure informativeness per se and
informativeness about the data, respectively, let us now turn back to the distance
measure d and the Joyce-Christensen measure s. The two conflicting goals of
informativeness and plausibility are equally important for d and s – and they are
all what matters for them. Hence, other things being equal – these other things
being the probabilities (plausibility values) of the hypotheses given the data E and
the background information B – the overall d- or s-value of hypothesis H relative
to E and B is the greater, the higher the informativeness of H (in the respective
sense).
Clearly, if one knows the truth values of the theories one is assessing, then
the plausibility of a theory’s being true is of no interest anymore. In this case all
what matters is how informative the theories are. Yet in general we do not know
these truth values. Hence we consider how plausible it is that they are true in the
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world we are in, and how informative they are (about this world). Then we form
their overall value by combining these two parameters in some suitable way. One
such way immediately suggests itself: assign H as its overall value its expected
informativeness:
E (i0) = Pr (¬H | B) · Pr (H | E ∧B)− Pr (¬¬H | B) · Pr (¬H | E ∧B) ,
E (i1) = Pr (¬H | ¬E ∧B) · Pr (H | E ∧B)−
−Pr (¬¬H | ¬E ∧B) · Pr (¬H | E ∧B) .
A little bit of reformulation shows that
E (i0) = dPr (H,E,B) and E (i1) = sPr (H,E,B) .
So once again, d and s are exactly alike in the way they combine or weigh between
informativeness and plausibility – which is to form the expected informativeness
(cf. Hintikka and Pietarinen 1966 and Levi 1961, 1963, but also Hempel 1960).
Their sole difference lies in the way they measure informativeness. In this sense,
part of the discussion about the right measure of incremental confirmation is a
discussion about the right measure of semantic information.
The measures i3, cont, and inf do again poorly:
E (i3) = E (cont) = 0
and
E (inf)
>
=
<
0⇔ Pr (H | E ∧B)
>
=
<
Pr (¬H | E ∧B) .
Hence only inf gives a non-trivial answer, viz. to maximize probability. But then
we can simply stick to probabilities and need not employ inf.
6. Revealing the Confirmational Structure
The preceding suggests the following answer to the question what goal incremen-
tal confirmation is supposed to further: Science aims at informative truth, and one
should stick to incrementally well confirmed theories, because incremental confir-
mation takes one to (the most) informative (among all) true theories. The question
is, of course, whether and in what sense this holds true.
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When is one theory at least as informative as another? Well, if the first theory
logically implies the second one, then the first theory is at least as informative as
the second one. When else? In general, there is no further condition that applies
equally to all probability measures Pr. Just as the only Pr-independent condition
for theory H1 to be at least as probable as theory H2 is that H2 logically implies
H1, so the above is the only Pr-independent condition for H1 to be at least as
informative as H2.
Hence, given a possible world (possibility, model) ω ∈ Mod (B), H1 is to be
preferred over H2 in ω if H1 is true in ω, but H2 is false in ω; or if H1 and H2 have
the same truth value in ω, and H1 logically implies H2 but H2 does not logically
imply H1. If H is logically true, then H is preferred in ω over any H2 which is
false in ω. On the other hand, any contingent H1 that is true in ω is preferred over
H , because these H1s are not only true in ω; they are also more informative than
H . Similarly, if H is logically false, then H is worse in ω than any theory that
is true in ω, but better than any theory that is false in ω (because they are all less
informative than H).
In this way each possible world ω induces a partial order among all theories4:
On the positive side one has all theories that are contingently true in ω, and on
the negative side there are all theories that are contingently false in ω. In be-
tween there are the logically determined theories. Among the true theories on the
positive side, the most informative, i.e. the complete theory about ω, is on top,
followed by all true hypotheses it logically implies, partially ordered according to
the logical consequence relation. This order goes all the way down to the least
informative among all true theories, the tautology, which is placed at the bottom
of the positive side. On that same level is the most informative among all false
theories, the contradiction, followed by all contingently false hypotheses, again
partially ordered according to the logical consequence relation. Let us call this
partial order the confirmational structure of ω.
For a given possibility ω, we would like a function f to stabilize to the correct
answer in the sense that f gets the confirmational structure of ω right after finitely
many steps (pieces of evidence from ω), and continues to do so forever without
necessarily halting (or giving any other sign that it has arrived at the true answer)
– cf. Kelly (1996). In general, stabilisation to the correct answer is a stronger
requirement than convergence to the correct answer. However, the Gaifman and
Snir convergence theorem actually gives rise to a measure 1 stabilisation result
(assign 1 to H if its probability exceeds .5, and 0 otherwise).
Let e0, . . . , en, . . . be a sequence of sentences all of which are true in ω ∈
Mod (B). A possibly partial function f : L × L × L → < reveals the confirma-
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tional structure of ω when presented (ei)i∈N iff for any contingent H1, H2 ∈ L,
and any H ∈ L:
1. ω |= H1, ω 6|= H2 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n: f (H1, Em, B) > 0 > f (H2, Em, B)
2. ω |= H1, ω |= H2
H1 ` H2 6` H1 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n: f (H1, Em, B) > f (H2, Em, B) > 0
3. ω 6|= H1, ω 6|= H2
H1 ` H2 6` H1 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n: 0 > f (H1, Em, B) > f (H2, Em, B)
4. |= H or |= ¬H ⇒ ∀m ≥ n : f (H,Em, B) = 0,
where Em =
∧
0≤i<m ei. An immediate consequence of the Gaifman and Snir
convergence theorem is
Observation 1 For any regular Pr on L and any {ei ∈ L : i ∈ N} separating
ModL there is X ⊆ ModL with Pr∗ (X) = 1 such that for all ω ∈ X (and
hence for all ω ∈ X ∩Mod (B), for any B ∈ L): dPr, sPr, and cPr reveal the
confirmational structure of ω when presented (eωi )i∈N .
Pr∗ is the unique probability measure on the smallest σ-field A containing the
field {Mod (A) : A ∈ L} such that Pr (A) = Pr∗ (Mod (A)). c is the Carnap
measure (Carnap 1962),
cPr (H,E,B) = Pr (H ∧ E ∧B) · Pr (B)− Pr (H ∧B) · Pr (E ∧B) .
However, observation 1 does not extend to all relevance measures. The log-ratio
measure r (Milne 1996) and the log-likelihood ratio measure l (Fitelson 1999,
2001a, 2001b) do not reveal the confirmational structure of almost every ω ∈
ModL when presented separating data.
rPr (H,E,B) = log
[
Pr (H | E ∧B)
Pr (H | B)
]
,
lPr (H,E,B) = log
[
Pr (E | H ∧B)
Pr (E | ¬H ∧B)
]
.
Like all relevance measures, r and l separate contingently true from contingently
false theories. More precisely, for any regular Pr on L, any {ei ∈ L : i ∈ N}
separating ModL, any B ∈ L, any ω ∈ X ∩Mod (B) (for some X ⊆ ModL
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with Pr∗ (X) = 1), and any two contingent H1, H2 ∈ L such that ω |= H1 and
ω 6|= H2 there exists n such that for all m ≥ n:
rPr (H1, E
ω
m, B) > 0 > rPr (H2, E
ω
m, B) , r = r, l,
where Eωm =
∧
0≤i<m e
ω
i . However, although r does distinguish between informa-
tive and uninformative true theories, it does not distinguish between informative
and uninformative false theories. l performs even worse on this count, because
it neither distinguishes between informative and uninformative true theories nor
between informative and uninformative false theories.
Which conditions are sufficient for a function to reveal the confirmational
structure of almost every world when presented separating data? Let f = f (i, p)
be a function of, among others, p = Pr (H | E ∧B) and some strength indicator
i = fi0,i1 based on i0 = Pr (¬H | B) and i1 = Pr (¬H | ¬E ∧B). It is clearly
necessary that f (1, 0) = f (0, 1) = 0. The reason is that p = 0 and i = 1, if H is
logically false; and p = 1 and i = 0 if H is logically true – and in these cases H
must be sent to 0, independently of what the data are.
1. Demarcation: f (1, 0) = f (0, 1) = 0.
In conjunction with Demarcation the following is sufficient:
4. Continuity: Any surplus in informativeness succeeds, if the difference in
plausibility is small enough.
∀ε > 0 ∃δε > 0 ∀s1, s2, t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1] :
s1 > s2 + ε & t1 > t2 − δε ⇒ f (s1, t1) > f (s2, t2) .
(The si are possible values of i, and the ti are possible values of p.) Continuity in
this general form is not necessary. It suffices that Demarcation is conjoined with
Continuity in Certainty.
3. Continuity in Certainty: Any surplus in informativeness succeeds, if plau-
sibility becomes certainty.
∀ε > 0 ∀ti, t′i ∈ [0, 1] : ti, t′i →i
{
1
0
∃n∀m ≥ n ∀sm, s′m ∈ [0, 1] :
sm > s
′
m + ε ⇒ f (sm, tm) > f (s′m, t′m) .
Theorem 2 Let Pr be a regular probability on L, let {ei : i ∈ N} ⊆ L sepa-
rate ModL, let f be a function of, among others, i and p satisfying Continuity
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in Certainty and Demarcation, and let Pr∗ be the unique probability measure on
the smallest σ-field A containing the field {Mod (A) : A ∈ L} such that for all
H ∈ L: Pr (H) = Pr∗ (Mod (H)), where Mod (A) = {ω ∈ModL : ω |= A}.
Then there exists X ∈ A with Pr∗ (X) = 1 such that the following holds for every
ω ∈ X , any two contingent H1, H2 ∈ L, and every H ∈ L:
1. ω |= H1, ω 6|= H2 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n : f (H1, Eωm) > 0 > f (H2, Eωm)
2. ω |= H1, H1 ` H2 6` H1 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n : f (H1, Eωm) > f (H2, Eωm) > 0
3. ω 6|= H2, H1 ` H2 6` H1 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n : 0 > f (H1, Eωm) > f (H2, Eωm)
4. |= H or |= ¬H ⇒ ∀m : f (H,Eωm) = 0.
However, even Continuity in Certainty is not necessary. The necessary and suf-
ficient condition for revealing the confirmational structure in almost every world
when presented separating data is this:
Definition 1 A possibly partial function f : L×L×L → < is a Gaifman and Snir
assessment function iff for every probability Pr on a Gaifman and Snir language
L (as described in section 2) and every {ei : i ∈ N} ⊆ L separating ModL there
is X ∈ A with Pr∗ (X) = 1 such that for all ω ∈ X and all m ∈ N :
I.
H1 |= H2 6|= H1
Pr (H1 | Eωm)→m
{
1
0
⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n : f (H1, Eωm) > f (H2, Eωm) .
II. |= H1, |= ¬H2, Pr (Eωm) > 0 ⇒ f (H1, Eωm) = f (H2, Eωm) = 0.
Definition 2 Let Pr be a probability on a Gaifman and Snir language L and let
{ei : i ∈ N} ⊆ L separate ModL. A possibly partial function f : L×L×L → <
reveals the confirmational structure of Pr∗-almost every world ω ∈ ModL when
presented separating (ei)i∈N iff there is X ∈ A with Pr∗ (X) = 1 such that for all
ω ∈ X , all contingent H1, H2 ∈ L, and all H ∈ L:
1. ω |= H1, ω 6|= H2 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n : f (H1, Eωm) > 0 > f (H2, Eωm) .
2. ω |= H1, H1 |= H2 6|= H1 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n : f (H1, Eωm) > f (H2, Eωm) > 0.
3. ω 6|= H2, H1 |= H2 6|= H1 ⇒ ∃n∀m ≥ n : 0 > f (H1, Eωm) > f (H2, Eωm) .
4. |= H or |= ¬H ⇒ ∀m : f (H,Eωm) = 0.
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f reveals the confirmational structure of almost every world when presented sep-
arating data iff for any probability Pr on a Gaifman and Snir language L and any
{ei : i ∈ N} ⊆ L separating ModL: f reveals the true assessment structure of
Pr∗-almost every world ω ∈ModL when presented separating (ei)i∈N .
Theorem 3 A possibly partial function f : L × L × L → < reveals the confir-
mational structure of almost every world when presented separating data iff f is
a Gaifman and Snir assessment function.
One reason why I still opt for the more general Continuity condition is that it
depends on the underlying convergence theorem which conditions are necessary
and sufficient for revealing the confirmational structure in so and so many worlds
when presented such and such data. More importantly, in the context of theory
assessment (Huber 2005) the idea behind the use of these limit considerations is
that they provide a theoretical justification for adopting the proposed conditions
in the here an now. When assessing theories we cannot wait until we have arrived
at the point of stabilisation for these theories. In fact, in general we will not
know when we have reached that point. We need to make our evaluations here
and now, where the probability values are somewhere in between their maximal
and minimal values, and we have no idea in which direction they will eventually
converge (if they do so at all). Hence a theory of theory assessment needs to
answer the question what to do when facing such a situation. Continuity gives an
answer, but Continuity in Certainty does not. However, we also need to justify this
answer – and we do so by appealing to the fact that when we satisfy Continuity
in the special case when the probability values converge, we almost surely reveal
the confirmational structure. As we usually do not know whether our probabilities
have started to converge, we should always satisfy Continuity.
7. Conclusion
I started from the question: Why should one stick to well confirmed theories
rather than to any other theories? The answer we got from absolute Bayesian
confirmation theory is that one should stick to absolutely well confirmed theories,
because absolute confirmation almost surely takes one to true theories. I con-
tinued by looking for an answer from incremental Bayesian confirmation theory.
This answer should be different from the previous one in order for incremental
confirmation to improve on absolute confirmation.
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It turned out that three popular measures of incremental confirmation, viz. the
distance measure d, the Joyce-Christensen measure s, and the Carnap measure
c, give an interesting answer: One should stick to incrementally well confirmed
theories, because incremental confirmation almost surely takes one to (the most)
informative (among all) true theories.
However, although all measures of incremental confirmation separate contin-
gently true from contingently false theories, not all of them distinguish between
informative and uninformative true and false theories. The log-ratio measure r
does not distinguish between informative and uninformative false theories, and
log-likelihood ratio measure l neither distinguishes between informative and un-
informative true nor between informative and uninformative false theories. A suf-
ficient condition for revealing the confirmational structure of almost every world
when presented separating data is the conjunction of Continuity and Demarcation,
the core principle of the plausibility-informativeness theory of theory assessment
(Huber 2005).
Notes
1 The Gaifman and Snir framework is not rich enough for proper theory assess-
ment. The reason is that the “theories” whose truth values one converges to by
conditioning on some separating set of data sentences are formulated within the
same “empirical” vocabulary as are the data sentences. So there is no room for
theoretical terms in the sense that the probability of a theory whose formulation
contains theoretical terms not occurring in any data sentence does not necessarily
converge to its truth value (in ω) when one conditionalizes on these observational
data sentences (from ω).
2 In Levi (1967), i3 is proposed as, roughly, a measure for the relief from agnos-
ticism afforded by accepting H as strongest relative to total evidence E ∧ B. For
cont and inf the reader is referred to Hintikka and Pietarinen (1966).
3 I owe this graphical illustration to Luc Bovens.
4 Here and elsewhere one should, of course, speak of axiomatizations of theories.
I also ignore that for each sentence there are infinitely many distinct, but logically
equivalent sentences.
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